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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 08-13555-jmp, 08-01420-jmp (SIPA)
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
7	LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,
8	Debtors.
9	x
10	In the Matter of:
11	LEHMAN BROTHERS, INC.,
12	Debtors.
13	x
14	
15	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
16	One Bowling Green
17	New York, New York
18	
19	July 20, 2011
20	10:01 AM
21	
22	BEFORE:
23	HON. JAMES M. PECK
24	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
25	

Page 2 1 2 [Docket No. 18106] Debtors' Motion for Authorization to 3 Terminate and Settle or Reject Certain Prepetition Derivatives 4 Contracts with Trusts for which U.S. Bank National Association 5 Serves as Indenture Trustee and Related Relief 6 [Docket No. 17282] Debtors' Motion to Amend the Order 7 Establishing Procedures to (i) Restructure, (ii) Make New or 8 9 Additional Debt or Equity Investments in, and/or (iii) Enter 10 Into Settlements and Compromises in Connection with Existing Real Estate Investments 11 12 13 [Docket No. 181221] Debtors' Motion for Authority to (i) Enter 14 into the Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Proposed by the 15 Lehman Creditors and the SunCal Trustee on Behalf of the SunCal 16 Involuntary Debtors in Eight of the SunCal Involuntary Debtors' 17 Cases; (ii) Enter into the Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan 18 Proposed by the Lehman Lenders in Eleven of the SunCal 19 Voluntary Debtors' Cases; and (iii) Participate in any Auction 20 of the SunCal Debtors' Assets 21 [Docket No. 16259] Motion of Evangelical Christian Credit Union 22 23 for Relief from the Automatic Stay 24 25

Page 3 1 2 [Docket No. 18306] Debtors' Motion for (i) Approval of 3 Stipulation and Order Regarding Chapter 11 Plans and (ii) Stay 4 of Related Discovery 5 6 [Docket No. 18157] Motion of Joseph Arena, Roland Hansalik, 7 George Barclay Perry for an Order Modifying the Automatic Stay 8 to Allow Payment of a Judgment Under the Directors and Officers 9 Insurance Policies Issued to the Debtors 10 11 [Docket No. 18033] Motion of Merrill Lynch Portfolio 12 Management, Inc. and Merrill Lynch Capital Services, Inc. to 13 Compel Specific Performance of Subordination Agreement Terms 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Transcribed by: Ellen S. Kolman

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Page 13 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Be seated please. Good morning. 3 MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Miller. MR. MILLER: Harvey Miller from Weil, Gotshal & Manges 5 on behalf of the debtors. 6 7 If Your Honor, please, may we start with the contested matters? I believe that will allow --8 THE COURT: That might allow people to leave. 9 10 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good. Let's do that. 11 12 MR. MILLER: And it's going to be real hot today. 13 So, we would be starting, Your Honor, with item 5 on 14 the agenda which is the debtors' motion seeking approval of a 15 stipulation and proposed order dated June 30, 2011. 16 Given the history, Your Honor, of these highly 17 accentuated and articulated polar positions that have been 18 taken by different constituencies in these Chapter 11 cases, 19 one might easily have predicted that the events that have 20 produced the subject stipulation were unbelievable except for 21 the fact that they did occur. 22 As a result of an idea suggested by my partner, Lori 23 Fife, that germinate into a course of action on June 16th, 24 2011, over 150 attorneys, financial advisors, financial 25 institutions and others gathered in the offices of Weil to meet

with the debtors' representatives and their professionals in a gigantic effort to try and reconcile the differences among creditors and to achieve a consensus as to the principals to be incorporated into a Chapter 11 plan for the debtors.

That initial summit meeting which began at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, extended almost until 5 a.m. the next morning as the debtors' representatives met with different constituencies on a collective basis and then sequentially.

Over the course of the following weekend, there were extended telephone conferences and discussions as to the negotiations and positions that had been discussed during the summer conference.

The meeting resumed as to many of the constituencies on Monday, June 20 and for a period that consumed the following ten days various meetings, telephone conferences, drafting sessions and extended negotiations were pursued. These included negotiations that the plan provisions involving the treatment of various classes of claimants, plan support agreements and revisions to the proposed disclosure statement, all of which culminated in the filing of the proposed second amended plan and disclosure statement dated June 29, 2011 that was subsequently modified and revised in light of additional comments received during the evening of June 30 and into the morning of July 1st, 2011 when the debtors filed a revised proposed second amended Chapter 11 plan and related disclosure

statement.

In connection with the filing, the debtors noted the second amended plan has the support of claimants holding approximately 100 billion dollars in claims and that 30 plan support agreements have been executed in connection with that plan.

During the hectic days and nights, attention also was given to the status of the discovery protocol order dated April 14, 2011. That order established a schedule and procedures in connection with discovery related to plan confirmation and other issues relating to the debtors' plan and alternative plans filed by creditors.

It contemplated a very extensive massive discovery process with enormous search mechanics involving many participants and as to which over 850 search requests had already been received. Among the negotiating parties it was agreed that such extended and costly discovery might become academic assuming the successful prosecution of the debtors' second amended plan and disclosure statement. The parties then agreed subject to the terms and conditions of the plan support agreements and other commitments that the discovery protocol order should be suspended and discovery held in abeyance during the parties -- among the parties for the proposed stipulation. All of that was agreed to and the stipulation which is before the Court resulted.

Under the terms of the stipulation, the debtors were required to file this motion not later than five business days after June 30, 2011. Pursuant to the stipulation, the alternative Chapter 11 plans filed in these cases, one by the ad hoc group of LBHI creditors and the other by what we characterize as the nonconsolidation plan proponents will be held in abeyance pending the prosecution of the debtors' second amended plan and disclosure statement subject to the provisions of the plan support agreements.

The parties of the stipulation have agreed to stay any and all discovery currently pending against any of the other parties to the stipulation pursuant to the discovery protocol order and all obligations of parties to each other. To respond to any discovery is stayed. And finally, that none of the parties to the stipulation will commence any other discovery against any other party relating to the debtors' second amended plan and disclosure statement and each of the alternative plans. However, if a party to the stipulation terminates a plan support agreement in accordance with its terms, then that party upon three business days notice may pursue any and all discovery that would -- it would be entitled to under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal bankruptcy rules of procedure or any other applicable rule, law or court order. And nonterminating parties, likewise, may pursue any and all such discovery against the terminating party.

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The right to call a termination event under the stipulation is fairly broad. Under paragraph 6, any creditor party may declare a termination event if, A, a nonappeable order denying approval of disclosure statement or confirmation is entered or the plan does not become effective by March 31, 2012.

As pointed out -- I'm sorry; as pointed out in support pleading filed by the ad hoc group of LBHI creditors, any adverse change in the treatment of such claimants under the second amended plan whether material or not may serve as a termination event in the sole discretion and election of the requisite majority of the particular holders.

Pursuant to paragraph 10 of the stipulation, if a termination event has been declared before the approval of the second amended disclosure statement, then the debtors agree to adjournment of the Section 1125 hearing to a date that is at least twenty-five days as to the termination event. The intent is to give the alternative plan proponents the opportunity to have their proposed plans considered and prosecuted.

If the termination event is subsequent to the approval of the second amended disclosure statement and it's in the process of solicitation, then the debtors are required to request a determination of the court on not less than twenty-five days notice that the termination event does not require resolicitation before the debtors may proceed to a confirmation

hearing. And, of course, the terminating parties shall be entitled to oppose such a motion.

If resolicitation is required, the debtors will have -- continue to have the right to request sequencing of the solicitation and confirmation process and the proponents of the alternative plans may oppose such requested sequencing.

In connection with the motion, Your Honor, pleadings have been filed on behalf of the ad hoc group of LBIH (sic) creditors and the unsecured creditors' committee in support of the instant motion.

In addition, there have been two responses filed; one by Centerbridge Credit Advisors and another by Danske Bank, one limited objection by PricewaterhouseCoopers AG (Zurich) and three joinders relating to the response of Centerbridge Credit Advisors and the limited objection of PricewaterhouseCoopers.

And point of fact, Your Honor, none of the responses, however characterized, object to the relief requested by the debtors and supported by the unsecured creditors' committee and the ad hoc group of LBHI creditors.

Essentially, the responses of Centerbridge Credit

Advisors and Danske Bank and the limited objection of

PricewaterhouseCoopers on the nature of statements signaling or

outlining their respective dislikes and intended rejection of

the debtors' second amended Chapter 11 plan, I assume, it is to

alert the Court to what their respective positions may be in

connection with the confirmation of that plan. But the statements and characterizations which are set forth in those pleadings, Your Honor, are not germane or indeed relevant to the consideration of the motion and the approval of a stipulation and the entry of a proposed order. These statements are superfluous and need not be addressed at this hearing.

To accommodate the respondents and consistent with extended discussions with the representatives of LBI (Europe), LBIE, which is not a party to the stipulation or any plan support agreement, the debtors have proposed an amendment to the proposed -- original proposed order attached to the motion to make it clear and unequivocal that the stipulation only applies to the parties that have executed the stipulation. As to nonparties to the extent appropriate and proper, such parties are not precluded and may undertake discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal rules of bankruptcy procedure and such other rules and orders that may be applicable.

After meeting and conferring with the appropriate -the person as to who the discovery is directed. In other
words -- and also, Your Honor, there's a -- one pleading refers
to targeted discovery and there is no preclusion on targeted
discovery by nonparties to the stipulation.

The objective of a meet and confer is to attempt to

establish an orderly process so that whatever discovery may be pursued will be efficient, expeditious, and not duplicative.

The additional language proposed also provides that if the parties are unable to agree, then discovery will occur as determined by the Court.

The precise language of the amendment is, if I may,
Your Honor, "Order that nothing in this order shall impair the
rights of any party-in-interest other than a party to the
stipulation to seek discovery in accordance with the applicable
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal rules of
bankruptcy procedure so long as the parties seeking discovery
meets and confers with the party on which the -- a discovery
request is to be served prior to serving the request and
subject to whatever additional requirements or procedures that
may be agreed to by the parties and/or ordered by the Court."

The events that occurred, Your Honor, during the first two weeks of June are attributed to the dedication, diligence and expertise of all parties who participated in the effort to bring consensus to these extraordinary cases. As in all things, it is not perfect but it is a major step forward in the administration of these cases; a step that may save these cases from the tremendous expense of voluminous and extensive discovery. The cooperation of the parties and the willingness to give up sleep and other activities to meet with the debtors and their representatives is much appreciated.

It is the sincere hope of the debtors that the major step forward will not be in vain but rather result in a consensual plan for all the debtors that inures to the benefit of all of the economic stakeholders and the parties-in-interest.

The stipulation and order, Your Honor, is an integral part of the process and it is respectfully requested that the Court grant the motion and approve the stipulation and enter the order as amended.

Finally, although the discovery protocol order has against all the parties to the stipulation will be suspended, the confidentiality provisions and agreements pursuant to the protocol shall remain in full course in effect.

With that, Your Honor, the debtors request that the motion be granted and the stipulation approved and the order entered. Thank you, Your Honor, unless you have any questions.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't have any questions. Thank you, Mr. Miller.

Mr. Dunne?

MR. DUNNE: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record,

Dennis Dunne from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy on behalf of

the official creditors' committee. And I'll be brief.

I echo Mr. Miller's comments and congratulate all the parties on the effort that they put in and success that was actually obtained as a result of those weeks of seemingly

endless negotiations.

The committee is very pleased that we've been able to achieve so much progress over the past month and we have garnered significant support among various creditor groups.

Prior to entering in the negotiations, the creditors' committee was hoping to achieve two objectives. One was to get broader creditor support for the plan but to also do so without abandoning the elements, the key framework components of the existing plan in terms of where we believed the litigation probable outcomes were with respect to the various legal issues presenting -- presented to the Court and all the parties. And I believe we've done that. We have a consensual plan that does not abandon the pillars of the plan and that we've managed to retain the support of the parties that supported the previous plan even though directionally some of the concessions moved away from the them, frankly, and get support from creditors at the domestic operating company levels that we did not have before. We worked closely with the debtors and the creditor groups to attain that support within the original framework.

One note; while we have made substantial progress on the plan, and I think there was a number of us that were surprised that we made so much of it so soon and I think that is a credit to all the parties who participated, there is more wood to chop.

We have more discussions to come with the foreign

affiliates, with LBI, and even some of the domestic creditors. But hopefully, we can build on the substantial progress that we've made to date and get even broader buy-in to the plan as we march towards confirmation.

So, in sum, the committee believes the most efficient and economical path forward is for the Court to approve the debtors' motion to suspend prosecution of the other competing plans and to stay any related discovery. And with that, unless the Court has any questions for the committee, I conclude my remarks.

THE COURT: I don't have any questions for you either.

MR. SHORE: Good morning, Your Honor, Chris Shore from White & Case on behalf of the ad hoc group.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. SHORE: I just have two comments.

First, we agree with Mr. Miller that this has not been an easy plan negotiation given the capital structure. To say that the debtors and their counsel have been herding cats is an understatement. And when handing out credit from the group's perspective, the debtors and their counsel have done a great job in building consensus here and to some extent making everyone a little unhappy. And I mean that in a good way.

We do note that the process of getting everybody in the same room was made easier by the discovery framework which was ordered by this Court and we agree with Mr. Miller that the

timing of the settlement and the launch of discovery were not The fact is that a substantial number of people coincidental. did get together in the same room and become convinced that on the economics of this plan, peace was better than war.

My second point, though, is this is fragile piece as we said in our papers and that the bargain has been struck is literally down to single bases point recoveries within the various groups. And based on our participation in the negotiations, we feel confident that there really isn't any more to give by any constituency. Notwithstanding the Court has before it a few statements put forth by parties essentially for the point that they think they deserve more, I'm going to take the lead of Mr. Miller and not rise to debate and debate any of that now; we could be here for hours.

I will, however, note, to say that if it's the party's intention to start a war with the idea that they're going to be getting more or that their treatment is unfair, from the group's perspective we think they may be a little naïve in the cost benefit analysis and we'd implore them to get on board on this plan on these economics.

THE COURT: Okay. Before hearing from parties who have filed responses with limited objections to the extent they wish to be heard after the opening statements that have been made by counsel for the debtor, the ad hoc committee, and the committee, I just want to make a comment which is designed to

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not chill presentations but to note that this is not an opportunity to stand on a soap box and make statements about positions that might be asserted at some future date in connection with some future matter to be heard here whether it's the disclosure statement itself or plan confirmation.

Everybody who has filed a response is free to comment but limit those comments to the matter which is actually before me which is the motion for approval of the stipulation and order regarding plans and the stay of related discovery.

Merits types arguments that have been made in the papers really have no place here. And so, say what you want to say about the matter which is before me but please refrain from trying to make headlines. Okay? I'll hear what people have to say.

MR. QURESHI: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record, Abid Qureshi, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld on behalf of Centerbridge. I certainly don't intend to repeat anything in our papers. I rise only to advise the Court that we are okay with the language proposed in the debtors' reply that reserves the right of those that continue to object to the amended plan, to take discovery. We've been informed by the debtors that they will confer with us in the ordinary course and pursuant to the applicable federal rules. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Fine. Thank you. Is there anybody who is dissatisfied with the language that has been proposed in

Page 26 the amended order? Apparently not. Is there anyone else who wishes to be heard with respect to the order as amended? There's no response. The motion is approved. MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor. The next motion, Your Honor, number 6, is Jones Day's motion. THE COURT: Those who wish to leave as a result of having considered item number 5 may do so. Let's just wait one moment while we allow the courtroom to clear and people to sit down who might want to find seats. (Pause) THE COURT: This demonstrates the wisdom of taking item number 5 first. MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor. MS. LAUKITIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Lisa Laukitis from Jones Day on behalf of Roland Hansalik, George Barclay Perry and Joseph Arena. The parties have moved for a comfort order to permit payment of a judgment under the debtors' D&O policies. I'm here today with my partner Philip Cook. There is a pro hoc motion pending for Mr. Cook but we would ask that he be authorized to make argument today and we can hand up the order at the conclusion. THE COURT: As far as I'm concerned, the pro hoc is deemed granted. But with the change in our rules since July 1,

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Page 27 1 there's a 200 dollar check that has to be paid at some point. 2 MS. LAUKITIS: I don't --3 THE COURT: It's a fairly steep price to speak but go 4 ahead and be my quest. MS. LAUKITIS: Mr. Cook is worth every penny, I assure 5 6 you. 7 THE COURT: Well, let's find out. 8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Does that take care of the debt 9 limit, Your Honor? 10 Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate it. MR. COOK: 11 With that, we are here on a motion for a comfort order. As the 12 Court knows, you know, seven prior comfort orders have been 13 entered. And our view, as we set forth in our motion is that 14 while the cases support the fact that the proceeds of the D&O 15 policy -- while the policies themselves may be the assets of 16 the estate, the proceeds are not and particularly under the 17 circumstances here where entity coverage has been deleted from 18 the policy and there is no evidence of an indemnity obligation 19 under part B. As the estate has stated on many occasions prior 20 and with their support here, we'd ask that the Court grant the 21 motion to permit the insurance companies to make the payment 22 for the current legal obligation. 23 THE COURT: Let me just ask a very basic question. 24 This is, as you have styled it, a comfort order. Is this 25 something that the insurance company has requested as a

condition to making the fifteen million dollar payment under the FINRA award or is this something that the parties themselves have determined is appropriate practice under the circumstances because of reasoned doubt as to whether or not it would be appropriate to make the payment, absent the entry of an order?

MR. COOK: I am here representing three insured persons.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. COOK: And it is -- it is, from our view, has been the practice from the outset of the estate and those involved in these proceedings to seek a comfort order. The cases generally do hold, particularly under the facts here that these proceeds are not assets of the estate and the estate has consistently taken that position. However, because of other issues, I think I would answer the Court's question about the insurance companies' position somewhat precisely. They have recognized it is and has been the practice here.

I don't think either the moving parties or the insurers believe that the Court has jurisdiction over those and that's why the motion has been styled and argued as it has; that to the extent applicable and necessary, to the extent that these proceeds are assets of the estate, we're seeking a comfort order which will permit them to then pay without concern that they're violating the automatic stay. There are

cases that have held -- although I believe under different factual circumstances -- that the estate may have an interest in insurance policy proceeds.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. DAVIDSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Steven

Davidson with Steptoe & Johnson and my partner Evan Glassman.

We represent the claimant in the underlying case U.S. Airways and we support the motion and are here if you have any questions of us. Thank you.

THE COURT: I don't.

MS. MARCUS: Good morning, Your Honor. Jacqueline

Marcus, Weil Gotshal & Manges on behalf of LBHI and its

affiliated debtors. As indicated in our statement in support,

Your Honor, we too support the requested relief.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. O'DONNELL: Your Honor, Dennis O'Donnell, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy on behalf of the committee. We also don't have any objections to the relief requested in the motion. We've noted, as we've noted in the past, that we do reserve our rights with respect to some potential time in the future where the facts might change and the estate might have an interest in these proceeds but agree that, at this point in time, that's a purely speculative interest and we don't have an interest in these proceeds.

THE COURT: Okay. Is anybody here from New Jersey?

MR. DAVIDOFF: Yes, Your Honor. Merrill Davidoff from Berger & Montague. I'll try to be brief, Your Honor, and not repeat anything that was said in our papers but I would like to supplement the objections that we made with a few observations.

There has been no demonstration of the background of this FINRA judgment whatsoever made by the insureds here or by the insurers. We see that a proceeding was instituted in December of 2009. There's no basis for coverage, why is that covered by either the 2007/2008 policy year or the 2008/2009 policy year. So there's no demonstration of coverage for this at all.

There's no demonstration -- no linkage of the allegations, no demonstration of what was alleged in the FINRA matter and why that should be subject to coverage. The respondents of the movants made the point that New Jersey has acquiesced in prior attempts to tap the policy, mostly for defense costs and for some settlements. But that situation has drastically changed. These policies have been severely depleted.

I don't know whether Your Honor received the papers that we sent in yesterday afternoon. We sent a courtesy copy down to Your Honor's chambers when we filed them. But the background of this is that twenty-eight approximately or more opt-out actions have been stayed by motions to dismiss the class actions have been pending. And these policies have been

steadily depleted, mostly to pay defense costs and now to pay a rather sizable settlement.

And I'd also like to note our objection -- strenuous objection to the effort to wave the fourteen-day appeal period. We should be given an opportunity to try to put this before the District Court that stayed all of these actions, including New Jersey's action which was forcibly -- forcibly hauled into the MDL in the Southern District of New York, an attempt to put that. And the attempt to waive the fourteen-day appeal period really is an attempt to trample on and extinguish our appeal rights.

I would note that it was over a month from the time that the FINRA judgment was entered in June until the movants actually moved for relief from the automatic stay. received an extension from the claimants, they received an extension from FINRA. No reason to believe they couldn't receive a similar extension of appellate proceedings were pending in the District Court. The fourteen-day appeal period is very short.

So I would urge Your Honor to inquire a little more deeply into this before even considering granting the motion. What is the background of the FINRA judgment, when was it asserted, why is there coverage under the FINRA judgment for this and, if Your Honor determines that the motion should be granted, Your Honor should not -- should strike out, at the

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very least, the portion that waives the appeal period to give the objectors and opportunity to perfect an appeal and get it before the District Court that has back-burnered all of the cases, including New Jersey which lost almost 200 million dollars on Lehman securities, that's back-burnered all of those cases pending disposition of motions directed to the class action.

There is an automatic stay for the class action cases. There is no automatic stay for opt-out cases. It was a procedural device that was entered by Judge Kaplan. We also attached as Exhibit 7, if I could call Your Honor's attention just to some language. This was another effort about a year and a half ago by the class claimants to get discovery and that's Exhibit 7 to the papers we filed yesterday. And in that opinion, explaining why he would not -- I don't meant the automatic stay; I mean the stay that judge Kaplan had entered in the PSLRA stay. He distinguished the Worldcom case and analogized the Lehman case to the Revco Securities litigation.

And among other things, he say this is a December 11th, 2009 order by Judge Kaplan, right around the time, incidentally, that U.S. Airways was filing its initial claim in the FINRA proceeding. "The facts here are akin instead to In re: Revco Securities litigation and like cases. Here, unlike Worldcom but like Revco, there are no court-ordered settlement discussions. Similarly, lead plaintiffs have not demonstrated

a risk critical to the outcome in Worldcom that the defendants, as opposed to nonparty Lehamn, will be insolvent if discovery is delayed until after the motion to dismiss currently subjudice is decided," And denied the motions to lift the PSLRA discovery stay.

That situation has drastically changed. At the very least, we should have an opportunity to put this -- to seek to put this before Judge Kaplan on appeal and I urge Your Honor, if he -- in the event that Your Honor does grant the motion, not to grant the portion of the motion that seeks waiver from the fourteen-day appeal period.

THE COURT: I have two --

MR. DAVIDOFF: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- questions for you.

MR. DAVIDOFF: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The first relates to your standing to object. There are arguments that I have read in the papers indicating that, under applicable New York law, a party such as the State of New Jersey that is simply waiting in the wings, really can't complain about insurance proceeds going to the first claimant that gets a judgment. So question number one is what standing do you have to complain in the first instance? Question number two is what have you done between your first knowledge of the FINRA preceding and today to go before Judge Kaplan and seek relief?

MR. DAVIDOFF: Well, the answer is we have not yet sought relief from Judge Kaplan --

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. DAVIDOFF: That's -- that's a good question, Your Honor, but I think we were focus, having only become aware of this pretty much at the last minute, we were focused on filing our objection before Your Honor and then we -- our intention was present our position before Your Honor and then seek relief in the District Court, preferably before Judge Kaplan if it would be accepted as a related matter.

But I think Your Honor asks a good question. Perhaps we should have done that simultaneously, in hindsight, given Your Honor's question. But we certainly intend to do that. I am aware of cases under New York law that hold that, you know, it's basically first come, first served but I think what's happened here is a number of cases have been back-burnered and I don't know why there was no effort to seek a stay of the FINRA proceedings.

I'd also argue that these policies are not merely proceeds, they're policies; they were purchased by Lehman. And I'm aware of the split in the authorities but I think the weight of the authority is that these are property of the estate and relief from the automatic stay is needed. And under 105(a), Your Honor has the discretion, Your Honor has the authority to enter such orders as are equitable, irrespective

of the ordinary rule where, you know, there isn't a bankruptcy proceeding.

THE COURT: Can you explain why the State of New

Jersey acquiesced during each of the earlier occasions when

comfort orders were sought, with respect to settlements and the

use of proceeds to advance defense costs to officers and

directors and others who are entitled to coverage under these

various policies?

MR. DAVIDOFF: I can answer as to the one occasion where we affirmatively acquiesced by signing onto a stipulation because I was involved in those discussions, Your Honor. We felt it was inequitable, even though we were adversaries of these insureds, for them to be deprived of funds for their defense costs so we acquiesced, reserving our rights, in a stipulation -- and I don't have that stipulation before me. It was quite some time ago -- for defense costs to be advanced. And we didn't object on some prior occasions but we have objected on this occasion and -- to put the matter first before Your Honor and, depending on the outcome here, before the District Court.

So I think at this point, one thing that the movants and the insurers have not disclosed is how much of these policies have been depleted and why is this FINRA claim, which was filed in December of '09, in either the '07/'08 tranche of policies to the '08/'09 tranche of policies? I don't

understand that. Was the claim asserted earlier? Why is there coverage? I mean, there has been the sparsest showing, maybe no showing. And I recognize that we're a lonely objector and a lonely voice objecting and, you know, it's not fun to be -- it's not fun to be the guy in the corner but I think something has to be done here or these policies will be completely depleted before any of the opt-out cases have an opportunity to reduce their claims to judgment.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DAVIDOFF: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Etkin, do you have a dog in this

MR. ETKIN: We did file a reservation of rights, Your Honor. We did not object to the motion because, dating back to the first of these types of motions where comfort orders were sought from the Court, we were involved in the crafting of the language that made sure that there was no determination that the stay was, in fact, applicable and reserved on the issue of whether the proceeds were property of the estate, rather than have that issue determined because we didn't believe, nor did the movants or the debtor believe, at the time, that that determination was necessary.

We have a view that the proceeds are not property of the state, the same view as expressed to you by the movant, the debtor and, to some extent, the committee. But rather than get

fight?

into hat issue, we didn't feel it was necessary so long as the order carved that out. We filed the reservation of rights because the debtor had filed papers indicating that there would be some changes to the order that were not identified in the papers so we wanted to make sure that whatever order was ultimately presented to Your Honor reflected those same terms that are contained in the prior orders that Your Honor signed as to those issues that were significant to us.

I should state, and I probably didn't state for the record, that we represent the institutional lead plaintiffs and the securities class actions. Like Mr. Davidoff, we too are obviously concerned about the burn rate with respect to the policies. But, frankly, we did not object because of the history of orders that have been entered and the issues that have already been raised. And we've looked at the revised order and it contains the language that we've seen in the prior orders so we have no -- we have no objection.

We also filed a reservation of rights because, to the extent that the Court would entertain the -- a determination on the issue at this juncture which, again, we don't believe is necessary, that the proceeds are or are not property of the estate. And we believe that additional briefing would be necessary and additional argument would be necessary. So we wanted to reserve those rights as well.

THE COURT: But as to the relief that's being sought

today in the motion, at least in respect to the form of order that you have reviewed, you have no objection to the entry of that order?

MR. ETKIN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. COOK: Your Honor, just very briefly in response to the comments of counsel from New Jersey. The motion expressly states that we're not asking the Court to make any determination as to the rights to coverage, to become involved in whether the insurance companies have defenses. The order that we sought simply is one that provides comfort to the insurance companies that payment of policy proceeds will not violate the automatic stay.

We have shown that, under New York law, we have a contractual right to those policy proceeds. The insurance companies have not articulated, as we state in the motion, any defense to payment or to those contractual rights. And we've shown that by August 3rd, if those -- if the award is not paid, the award that was entered by FINRA on March 27th, there will be significant prejudice to the three insured persons who've moved for this order.

And I believe Judge Gonzalez, in the Enron case -there's a bench ruling that was attached to the Zurich motion;
we've referenced that in our motion. And he makes clear that
in making a decision about whether to enter a similar order, in

finding that the proceeds are not the assets of the estate.

That it's not his purview to change the contractual rights of the parties but to merely make a much more limited decision as to whether or not it would violate the terms of the automatic stay to provide and order allowing the insurance payment.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COOK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Is there anything more on this?

MR. DAVIDOFF: I have one sentence, if I may be permitted, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, you're going to have to come to the podium to express it.

MR. DAVIDOFF: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I just would note for the record that New Jersey disputes the assertion that the claimants have shown that there's prejudice and that the August 3rd deadline, like the prior deadlines, could not be further extended or that there would be penalties imposed in the event the Court were not to lift the automatic stay by that time.

THE COURT: I don't understand what you just said.

MR. DAVIDOFF: The -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. Counsel said the award was entered by FINRA on March 27th. There was a substantial delay in seeking relief from the automatic stay. There were extensions granted by FINRA. If the Court were to refuse to lift the automatic stay, there's not showing that

there would be any automatic levying of penalties against the insured who are seeking recompense from the policy and there's no showing that there would be any further prejudice. U.S. Airways would have to stand in line, like other claimants who are equally deserving or more deserving than U.S. Airways. That was the point I was making. I don't think the papers sufficiently demonstrate prejudice and I wanted to note our position on that.

MR. COOK: Just a quick point of clarification. I apologize for misspeaking. I believe it was pointed out to me I said March 27th. Exhibit B, which we have filed to our motion, is a copy of the FINRA award. It was entered on May 27th. The first opportunity we had to make the motion after the delivery of that award was on our -- for this omnibus hearing and we filed our motion on June 29th. I am assured -- and counsel for U.S. Airways is here and can assure the Court -- there will be no further delay beyond the arrangement that we have with FINRA and with U.S. Airways to get this paid by early August and the only reason for that concession was so that we could come here and obtain the comfort order.

THE COURT: Okay. Now we'll hear from U.S. Airways counsel.

MR. DAVIDSON: Just very briefly, Your Honor, to underscore the point that we have agreed to this extension to allow this process to run its course but if the payment is not

forthcoming from the insurance policy, we will then seek to enforce our award against the three individual respondents through whatever means we can. So that's why we're here today and have agreed to the extension with FINRA and counsel for respondents.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DAVIDSON: Thank you.

end of the presentation prompted two comments that emphasize that there is actual prejudice to the clients that have moved for what amounts to a comfort order. These individuals Joseph Arena, Roland Hansalik and George Barclay Perry are seeking a comfort order to permit insurance proceeds to be utilized to satisfy a fifteen million dollar award in an arbitration that was conducted under the FINRA rules in which U.S. Airways was the successful claimant. I have actually reviewed the FINRA arbitration award which was submitted to my chambers in time for my review of people coming out here today. And it appears to be a legitimate copy of that arbitration judgment.

The State of New Jersey, through counsel, is the only party objecting to what has become a fairly standard protocol in these cases and in other large Chapter 11 cases, mainly coming before the Court to obtain an order permitting insurance proceeds to be used for the advance of defense costs or to satisfy settlements or judgments in connection with individuals

who are covered under officers and directors policies.

I don't need to decide the ultimate question which is embedded in a motion of this sort which is whether or not these proceeds are or are not property of the estate. There seems to be a general recognition on the part of those parties who have moved for relief as well as on the part of -- that Mr. Etkin, who spoke on behalf of the lead plaintiffs, that we're probably not dealing with the property of the estate. We are dealing, however, with what he claimant's view as a wasting asset because the policy limits in question are being used over time to satisfy the needs of those who come ahead of others in the queue.

The State of New Jersey, through its papers and in the presentation just made by its counsel, tells a story of having wasted time in an appellate process in the Third Circuit and then being subjected to a stay in the District Court up the street in which Judge Kaplan is managing multidistrict litigation. That's not my problem. The fact that the State of New Jersey is but one representative of what I assume to be a whole host of third parties who may have claims that may someday rise to the level of a claim that could be a claim against proceeds of an insurance policy, is the rankest of speculation in terms of having a right to these proceeds today.

The case authority presented in the motion and in some of the supporting papers makes clear that, under applicable New

York law, this is a first come, first served issue. In fact, it promotes a race to judgment. But that's what the law is. The fact that the State of New Jersey may be waiting in the wings with a claim that may not be subject to applicable insurance coverage is a regrettable fact of life. I question whether or not New Jersey has actual standing under these circumstances to appeal this judgment and I certainly question whether or not there's the ability to somehow get this before Judge Kaplan as a related matter. But they're free to do so. I'll enter the order.

MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. MARCUS: Item 7 on the agenda, Your Honor, is the motion of Merrill Lynch Portfolio Management, Inc and Merrill Lynch Capital Services, Inc. to compel specific performance of subordination agreement. Mr. Barrett, I believe, will handle that, initially.

MR. BARRETT: Good morning, Your Honor. Peter Barrett from Kutak Rock on behalf of Merrill Lynch Portfolio

Management, Inc. and Merrill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.

Merrill Lynch entities have moved under 105 to compel the debtors to comply with the terms of the so ordered stipulation that's been entered in this case as well as the subordination agreement between the parties. I think initially, if it's okay with Your Honor, there's a couple of housekeeping matters that

I think may streamline the presentations.

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First, based on the responses of the debtors and the SIPA trustee, we will not be pursuing any sort of relief and can confirm that we are not seeking a relief against LBI or the SIPA trustee. Second, of the purposes of this motion, Merrill Lynch withdraws any request for tax and costs against the estates or attorneys' fees. And third, just to point out that Merrill is not taking the position that any ruling on this matter would prejudice the debtors or the committees with regard to the other four properties that are part of this entire transaction dealing with AHF. A relief here will not affect their rights. We don't have relief from stay on those properties. We have not asked for their consent under the subordination agreement and they have no duty to provide that or to provide evidence of that consent.

So, with that out of the way, what we're asking the Court to do is to direct the debtors to comply with the subordination agreement and the so ordered stipulation. Resolution of this motion now, we believe and we assert, will benefit the estates. We don't believe that any parties, including Merrill or the estates, would benefit from prolonged litigations. Any proceeds of the sale of this project that we're seeking, the Brampton project, are going to flow to Merrill. Merrill has over sixty-one million dollars in principle balance outstanding on its bonds. The most that

we're likely to get for this property is ten million dollars.

THE COURT: Can I stop you for a second?

MR. BARRETT: Yes.

THE COURT: As I read the papers filed in opposition to your motion -- and I think it would be good to deal with some of these issues -- there's a threshold question as to whether or not procedurally you can do this by motion instead of by adversary proceeding because you're seeking what amounts to a mandate of the court which is generally only available on -- by bringing an adversarial proceeding. So I'd likeyou to comment on the procedural question.

Secondly, as we have discussed during the course of a telephone conference, which I believe you participated in and helped arrange several weeks ago --

MR. BARRETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- I reviewed the subordination agreement and, even before seeing the debtors' papers, had questions as to whether or not, as a substantive matter, you were entitled to relief in the first instance. I'd like you to comment as to why you're entitled to any relief. And finally, why are you here as opposed to being in a state court in Florida which is best equipped to deal with the applications under Florida real property law.

MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, I'll address all of those. First, the procedural issue. Yes. I am completely aware of

the requirements of 7001. However, in this instance, we are asking the Court, as a natural extension of it's so order stipulation that was just entered, to direct the debtors to comply with that. We don't believe that there's any prejudice to the debtors in this instance. We also don't believe there's any sort of due process violation.

Merrill is -- understands and is mindful of the status of this case, the enormity of this Court's docket. We're trying to streamline presentation and, in fact, both the debtors and the committee have, in the past, used motions to compel in order to streamline relief from this case. And the debtors, they filed a motion to compel performance of Metavante to comply with certain obligations. And the committee filed a motion of the committee to direct the examiner to comply with the Court's order. And just like Merrill in this case, they were asking the Court for assistance in getting a party to the case to comply with one of the Court's own orders. I understand that two wrongs don't make a right but I would assert and hope that three might suggest a custom in the case.

Going to the substantive --

THE COURT: Before you go to the next point --

MR. BARRETT: Yes?

THE COURT: -- I think there's a fundamental distinction between seeking compliance with court orders that, within their four corners, call for relief and seeking what

amounts to specific performance of a state law subordination agreement which, on its face, is either obscure or, frankly, can be read completely opposite from the interpretation you're seeking. I read it as not providing for the relief that you seek.

So for me to grant the relief that you seek, I would need to conduct what amounts to a full evidentiary hearing in the context of an adversary proceeding which included full discovery. I'm not in a position to do what you seek because I don't think you're entitled to that relief. Not only as a matter of procedure but as a matter of substance. So you have an almost impossible argument to make right now. What are you going to say?

MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, I felt, coming in here, based on the telephone conference that it would be an uphill battle and I'm --

THE COURT: You're climbing a cliff.

MR. BARRETT: Exactly, Your Honor. And, Your Honor, bullheaded or not, I'm happy to press on. But I --

THE COURT: It's up to you.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would -- Your Honor, I would like to attempt to convince the Court otherwise and I understand that it's a hard attempt but we -- you know, wrongly or not, we do not see the subordination agreement the same way the Court sees it, the same way the debtors see it.

Page 48 THE COURT: But see, since that's how I see it, you 1 2 can't win. At least you can't win in this context. 3 MR. BARRETT: I -- no, I --4 THE COURT: Both procedurally and substantively. MR. BARRETT: I understand that and I can try to 5 6 convince you otherwise. I -- you know --7 THE COURT: The words -- the words aren't there. Ι don't --8 9 MR. BARRETT: But the -- Your Honor --10 THE COURT: The only way that's there is consent. 11 MR. BARRETT: No. No, no, no. The first word that is 12 there is consent. And it's -- what the -- whoops. What the 13 subordination agreement says is that the debtor -- that the 14 debtor shall consent to any relief that AHF asks for. What 15 they've asked for here is short sale. They want the debtors' 16 relief -- consent to a short sale. The only way you can 17 consent to a short sale is by providing releases. You can't 18 consent to a short sale by saying I consent. And by the way, 19 we've asked twice for their consent which they concede they 20 must give to us under the subordination agreement and we have 21 not get --22 THE COURT: I think you're going to need a Florida 23 court or some other court that's familiar with documents of 24 this sort and with Florida real property law to agree with you

that consent, as you have sought to interpret it, means the

grant of a release.

MR. BARRETT: Well, Your Honor, the first sentence says consent, but what the second sentence -- the sentence below that -- says is that those subordinate lenders need to "do, execute, acknowledge, and deliver to Merrill, every such further acts, deeds, conveyance and instruments." And so, it's not the first sentence. It's not the consent that gets us through release.

It's that we ask for the consent; they have to give it to us. Then we ask for evidence of that consent, and the evidence of that consent is the release. And so, what Merrill has put before the Court is a request from AHF to do a short sale, and the position that the only way to consent to a short sale is by delivering that release.

THE COURT: Regrettably, the transactional lawyer who prepared this document either by design or through neglect and oversight did not use the word "release".

MR. BARRETT: Well, Your Honor, and I think -- respectfully, I think that that somewhat --

THE COURT: The word "release" does not appear in the document.

MR. BARRETT: Well, Your Honor, I don't think that you need to state a litany of fifty things that you can do --

THE COURT: Lawyers do.

MR. BARRETT: Lawyers do, but you don't need to.

Page 50 1 Lawyers can --2 THE COURT: Lawyers could have said, "and it shall 3 release" --4 MR. BARRETT: But, well, sir -5 THE COURT: -- "upon a request of Merrill". 6 doesn't say that. MR. BARRETT: Certainly it doesn't say that, and in 7 hindsight, you are correct. In hindsight, I'm sure whoever the 8 9 deal lawyer is kicking themselves for the language they've 10 drafted. But drafting broad language and providing broad 11 relief doesn't mean that that language is ineffective. 12 doesn't mean that if you say in a deed of trust or a mortgage 13 that this of yours, all other indebtedness, that you need to 14 list out all in hundreds of the other indebtedness. It applies 15 to everything. And here they've said, that you need to --16 shall give any and all of these further acts, deeds, 17 conveyances. And that's what we're asking for, and we're 18 asking for them to comply. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. BARRETT: I can tell you're convinced. 21 THE COURT: You're not getting that relief from me 22 today. 23 MR. BARRETT: I understand, Your Honor, but I 24 appreciate your time. 25 THE COURT: Okay. I don't know if the debtor wants to

say anything in response.

MS. MARCUS: Jacqueline Marcus, Your Honor, for the debtors. You've made all of my arguments, so thank you for that.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

MS. MARCUS: I just wanted to clarify a couple of points regarding the language in the subordination agreement.

First, with all due respect to Mr. Barrett, he didn't read the whole second sentence. The sentence that sets forth the litany -- and I'll start in the middle -- "every such further acts, deeds, conveyances, and instruments, as Merrill or the trustee may request for the better assuring and evidencing of the forgoing consent." And that's critical, because that's the limiting factor.

Secondly, Your Honor noted that the section does not mention the word "release". In fact, it does, but it mentions it in a different context, and I think that leads to our firm belief that people were thinking about releases. The next sentence talks about the subordinate lenders consenting to and authorizing the release by the senior lenders or the trustee of all or any portion of the project from the lien operation, and in fact, of the senior mortgage documents. So, within that specific provision, the word "release" was mentioned. It simply wasn't mentioned in connection with the subordinate lenders.

For all the reasons you alluded to, Your Honor, we request that the motion be denied.

THE COURT: The motion is denied.

MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honor. Now, we turn back to the beginning of the agenda to the uncontested portion.

Item number 1 on the agenda is the debtors' motion for authorization to terminate and settle or reject certain prepetition derivatives contracts with trust for which U.S. Bank National Association serves as indentured trustee and related relief. As indicated on the agenda, Your Honor, this is a uncontested motion. As the Court may recall, we filed a similar motion back in December 2010, and the Court granted the relief requested in that motion.

This motion is different in that it replies to different types of derivatives contracts. In support of the current motion, the debtors have declarations of Robert Hershan of Alvarez & Marsal, and Michael Trickey of Berkshire Partners, and the affidavit of David Duclos of U.S. Bank. Unless, the Court has any questions, the debtors request that the Court grant the relief requested in the motion, and enter the proposed order.

THE COURT: I don't have any questions, although I'm just going to ask if anybody on behalf of U.S. Bank National Association wishes to say anything.

MR. PRICE: Your Honor, Craig Price, from Chapman and

Page 53 1 Cutler. We're fine. 2 THE COURT: I'm not sure if you could be heard, 3 because of your distance from the microphone. 4 MR. PRICE: We have no comments. THE COURT: Okay. I was offering you an opportunity 5 6 because I had read a recently filed affidavit suggesting that 7 there was some concern on the part of U.S. Bank that its various beneficiaries and constituents be notified concerning 9 this course of conduct. And the docket will speak for itself. 10 Anybody who wants to go to the docket will be able to do that. 11 Can you come back --12 MS. MARCUS: Craig? 13 THE COURT: -- and simply repeat your name for the 14 record. It didn't come through on the transcript. 15 MR. PRICE: Craig Price from Chapman and Cutler. We 16 have no comment. 17 THE COURT: Okay. MS. MARCUS: Your Honor, I also might add that as set 18 19 forth in the -- I think it's in the affidavit of Mr. Duclos --20 U.S. Bank did serve or did arrange to have -- I won't say 21 serve -- but did arrange to have copies of the motion provided 22 to the noteholders. 23 THE COURT: That's fine. 24 MS. MARCUS: Item number 2 on the agenda, Your Honor, 25 is the debtors' motion to amend the order establishing

procedures to restructure, make new or additional debt or equity investments in, and/or enter into settlements and compromises in connection with existing real estate investments. This matter was originally scheduled to be heard at the June 15th hearing. However, due to the fact that the debtors were continuing to negotiate the terms of the revised order with the ad hoc group, we adjourned the hearing to today.

Late yesterday, we agreed on the form of the proposed order with the ad hoc group, and we filed a revised order last night -- I apologize for the lateness of the hour -- together with two blacklines: one that marked the proposed order against the proposed order that we filed with the motion, and one that marked the proposed order against the first amended order. As a result of the resolution with the ad hoc group, the motion is currently uncontested. For the convenience of the Court and other parties, however, I thought it might make sense to very briefly summarize the changes that were made -- the salient changes.

First, we have added a new category -- and Your Honor, would you like a copy, or do you have the cleaner -- the blackline?

THE COURT: I'll take a copy, sure. Thank you.

MS. MARCUS: First, we added a new category of expenditures called "permitted expenditures", as to which the debtors are permitted to expend funds without the need to

provide notice to any party or obtain approval from the Court.

Permitted expenditures are, basically, two categories, with some subcategories. First, there are ordinary course expenses required for the sound operation and management of a property, and second there are protective advances that fall into three categories. First, to cure a superior loan default in an amount up to and including five million dollars; second, for real estate taxes and insurance premiums, and thirdly for nondiscretionary or emergency properly related purposes.

Based on the discussions with the ad hoc group and the creditors' committee, we have further agreed: first, that the protective advance to cure a superior loan default would be limited to an individual payment of five million dollars, or aggregate payments not in excess of five million dollars, with respect to a particular property, over the proceeding six month period. In the event that the cure payments for a superior loan default aggregate more than five million over that six month period, than they shall be treated as a new investment and subject to the procedures and thresholds for new investments under the order.

Second, we have agreed to include quarterly reporting as to certain permitted expenditures, namely those protective advances for nondiscretionary or emergency property-related purposes exceeding five million dollars, made by the debtors during the prior three months, as well as the aggregate of all

such protective advances made with respect to a particular property if the aggregate exceed ten million dollars or any multiple thereof. The form of the reporting is included in the proposed order.

We have changed the references to market-to-market carrying value, which were used throughout the order to reflect how the debtors and the creditors committee have actually been operating, which is to use estimated recovery value.

Calculations for purposes of the reporting requirements will be based on the estimated recovery values as of December 31, 2010, which had been agreed upon by the debtors and the creditors committee.

Next, the debtors will no longer need Court approval for new investments greater than five million but less than twenty-five million in connection with existing real estate investments with a value greater than a hundred million. That provision was deleted because it was really superfluous, and those investments were treated in other categories.

In connection with the reporting on new investments, as provided in the first amended order, we have made two modifications. The debtors will provide a range of value with respect to the relevant property that is consistent with the threshold set forth in the procedures, so that people can monitor our compliance with the procedures. And rather than including the city in which the property is located, the

debtors will identify the type of property using categories consistent with those used by the debtors in their monthly operating reports.

Finally, we have included the relevant defined terms in the new order rather than cross-referencing the definitions in the motion to make it easier for people to interpret the order. And we have made it clear that the term "real estate investment" may apply to situations in which the debtors own a particular parcel of real estate or a loan, and whether the debtors' investment is owned directly or through a joint venture, in which the applicable debtor has an interest.

In view of the fact that the sole objection to the motion has been consensually resolved, Your Honor, the debtors request that the Court grant the motion and enter the revised proposed order. I'm happy to answer any questions that you may have.

THE COURT: I don't have any questions. I've reviewed the papers, and I approve the motion.

MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honor. The next item will be handled by my partner, Alfredo Perez.

MR. PEREZ: Good morning, Your Honor, Alfredo Perez on behalf of the debtors. Your Honor, the next motion is the motion by the debtors to obtain approval to be able to prosecute the various SunCal plans. We've been before the Court on this, Your Honor, several times. There's no objection

this time, but I wanted to give the Court a little bit of a status report of where we are, the dates, and the timing.

In essence, Your Honor, the debtors filed their original plans in the SunCal cases in September of '09. Those plans have been amended several times including as late as last Friday, the third amended plans, which we filed on Monday. In essence, Your Honor, those plans call for -- in both what I with the trustee, and the voluntary cases, in call the trustee cases, pursuant to which we have an agreement which don't have an agreement with the debtors, but we've negotiated with the creditors committee for either LCPI or LBHI or Lehman ALI, the respective debtor, getting a conveyance of the property, a release, and -- pursuant to that, we would pay for various costs associated with funding the plan, in connection with -- and the purpose for this particular motion is because the amounts that we had sought last time have increased.

So, in connection with the involuntary plans, which is over 1.1 billion of debt and approximately 350 million of value, the amounts that we're seeking are at up to 55 million dollars. And with respect to the voluptuary cases, in which we have loans totaling about 700 million dollars, and there's about 100 million dollars of value, approximately 22 million dollars to fund.

Your Honor, the disclosure statement hearings are set for this Friday, July 22nd; confirmation hearing is currently

scheduled for October 24th. So, there's on a fairly quick track to get up -- there's significant discovery which may or may not affect those deadlines. The only other thing Your Honor, was that on June 8th, of this year, the Ninth Circuit did have a -- conduct an oral argument with respect to the initial motion that's been before this Court, as to the applicability of the stay, and that is sub judice with the Ninth Circuit since June of last year.

Your Honor, we received no objections. The creditors committee had some comments to the form of the order we filed, an amended form of order last night, really by means of clarification. We did make one change. When we originally filed this motion in June it was the second amended plan. Now, we subsequently filed a third amended plan, so we've made those types of correcting changes in the proposed form of order. But other than that, Your Honor, I don't have anything further to say.

THE COURT: There is one thing I noticed in the proposed form of order. There's a provision that the committee shall have consent rights with respect to aspects of this process. That strikes me as unusual, and I'd like more information on it.

MR. PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor. The -- to some extent, they get consent rights on basically two things. They get consent rights if we're going to exceed, for any reason, exceed

the caps or the amounts that we think are going to be involved. And they also would get consent rights to the extent that there are competing plans that are also on file. The competing plans were posed to not allow us to credit bid for the assets. as the Court's aware, now we have -- we now have a Seventh Circuit case which says you can't do that pursuant to a plan. We have a Fifth and a Third Circuit case which say you can deny credit bid rights. To the extent that for some reason -- and we don't think it's go -- it's likely to happen, but to the extent, for any reason, the debtors' plans are approved and the voluntary debtors have filed plans for both the voluntary and the involuntary cases. So they have, kind of, the same set of plans that we have. To the extent those are approved and our credit bid rights are taken away, the creditors' committee would have consent rights with respect to the amounts that we would bid at any auction with respect to those assets.

Those are really the only two circumstances and they involve, you know, discretionary expenditure that we would have to evaluate at the time, based on litigation risk and all of the other various problems. And they've been an integral part of the process. We've had a -- you know, we've had extensive discussion, we had a mediation. The creditors' committee has participated in all of the things and they've always been, basically, at the table because this is a very high profile and, you know, significant involvement for the Lehman estate.

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THE COURT: This is a competing plan process in the Central District of California. Are there any rules of the game that have been established as to the management of that process?

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, there are -- I'm not quite sure I know exactly what the Court is asking, but there are -- you know, there has been extensive pre-trial orders that are entered, that have been entered with respect to the plan process. There is ongoing discovery. There is, you know, as I said, the -- this -- I guess, at least second hearing on the amended disclosure statements is set for this Friday. There's a voting deadline, there's a rejection deadline. So, there's a process that's been planned out between now and the end of October with respect to the plans, that is currently, you know, still in effect as of this morning. And I guess will, you know, going forward.

THE COURT: But as far as you know, these plans are being promulgated on the same time table and are being proposed to creditors at the same time?

MR. PEREZ: Exactly, Your Honor. They're both running in parallel tracks. The hearing on Friday is on our amended motion to approve the Lehman voluntary debtor plan, the Lehman trustee plan as well as all of the SunCal debtor plans and disclosure statements. So, yes, they're all running on the same parallel track.

THE COURT: And I'm a little bit curious as to what happened to the motion that was pending several months ago seeking further intervention from this Court with respect to alleged stay violations.

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, there was a hearing held before the California Bankruptcy Court in which the California Bankruptcy Court entered an order which I believe was filed in this case in which it -- in which -- and I don't want to characterize the hearing, but as a result of that order, we decided to withdraw our motion.

THE COURT: All right. So it was not the result of any consensual understanding reached with the voluntary debtors in the SunCal cases?

MR. PEREZ: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PEREZ: It -- as a result of that, in abundance of caution, we withdrew the motion.

THE COURT: And I realize that I'm treading in an area here where I probably should stay away. But, is there any process contemplated that might lead these highly litigated cases to a consensual resolution as opposed to the rather expensive path that you're on now, which is also fraught with some risk and uncertainty?

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, there was a mediation that occurred that resolved some of the issues. I think that

mediation process, while not active, it continues. And I do
think that certainly from the standpoint of the debtor and the
committee I know, we are very hopeful that at some point there
will be a resolution that will resolve this and avoid, really,
the tremendous expense that's going to be incurred between now
and October 24th. There are currently, probably thirty
depositions that have been either noticed or we've been told
that they're going to be going forward, plus document
discovery. And so, there's very extensive litigation going on
in the — in California.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MR. ODONNELL: Your Honor, Dennis O'Donnell, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy on behalf of the committee. Just to reiterate what Mr. Perez said, the committee has, as you probably know, we -- has well been integral to this process, has been involved with the SunCal process for some time. And the consent rights that are reflected in the order here are consent rights that we've actually had all along. We had consent rights to the prior plan amounts as well. And both the debtors here and the debtors there understand that out, you know, our involvement in consent and what happens out there is important.

On the other point you raise, Your Honor, in terms of consensual resolution, again, as I think Mr. Perez indicated, we are a strong proponent at this point of finding some kind of

consensual solution here. Because as he indicated, the process out there looks to be, you know, far from resolution. We do have a confirmation hearing scheduled for October 24th; we have side by side with that at this point a claims processor that they have, in lieu of proceeding with their equitable subordination complaints that have been subject of several hearings here, that the SunCal debtors have commenced or filed objections to our claims out there which essential mirror the equitable subordination claims. And that process is now going forward simultaneously. So, the, you know, the likely expense and complications that could arise out of that dual process are hard to predict at this time and if there's a way to resolve it consensually, we have been urging the debtors to do so and have also been speaking to other parties in the situation, hoping that there is some way to get that done.

But in terms of the relief before the Court today, we have no objection to it. We have been involved in diligencing the amounts involved, that the debtors' proposed to pay under the two plans and will be involved in any decision with respect to bidding, if the debtors — and we think it's an unlikely prospect, but if the debtors are ultimately required to bid in the event that the SunCal plans are confirmed, we will be involved in determining whether it makes sense to bid and at what level they should bid.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Page 65 Thank you, Your Honor. 1 MR. ODONNELL: 2 THE COURT: This is approved. 3 MR. PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 Your Honor, with respect to the Merrill motion, would you like us to prepare and submit an order on that? 5 6 THE COURT: I think in the interest of good order, you 7 should. 8 MR. PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 9 Your Honor, the next motion is Mr. Tillinghast's 10 motion, the ECCU. 11 MR. TILLINGHAST: Good morning, Your Honor. Edward 12 Tillinghast from Sheppard, Mullin on behalf of Evangelical 13 Christian Credit Union. 14 This is a motion to lift the stay in connection with 15 ECCU's first mortgage lien on a piece of property in Riverside, 16 The - we submitted in connection with the motion 17 an affidavit from Michael Bobbit (sic) on one of their 18 appraisals showing the value of the property was 2.38 million; 19 the amount of ECCU's lien is -- senior lien is 6.6 million. 20 The debtor initially opposed the motion. The committee joined 21 in the opposition and then subsequent to that, the debtor has 22 withdrawn their opposition. So we have an order, unless Your 23 Honor has questions, granting the motion. 24 THE COURT: It's now an opposed motion. 25 MR. TILLINGHAST: Right.

Page 66 THE COURT: So I don't have any questions. Except --1 2 MR. TILLINGHAST: May I approach --3 THE COURT: -- except what happened? 4 MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, Alfredo Perez on behalf of the debtors. Your Honor, this is one of the SunCal debtors, 5 Emerald (sic) -- and --6 7 THE COURT: Right, I read the papers. And I'm 8 generally familiar with what's involved here. 9 MR. PEREZ: Generally, Your Honor, we decided that 10 we -- that it didn't make any sense to fight the issue of the 11 marshalling twice. So we're going to get -- we would have our 12 rights as a creditor on the property in California, our state 13 law rights to request marshalling and then we'll go to 14 California -- they haven't moved to lift the stay in 15 California. We thought it was premature for them to come here 16 to lift the stay. We're preserving all of our rights and when 17 and if they ever file a motion in California, we will make the 18 same arguments. 19 THE COURT: Is this property, in one form or another, 20 to be the subject of the pending SunCal cases or is it a 21 separate matter? 22 MR. PEREZ: I think it's a separate matter, Your 23 Honor. Yeah, it's separate. 24 THE COURT: It just happens to have the SunCal name 25 attached to it?

Page 67 MR. PEREZ: Well, it's one of the voluntary debtors, 1 2 but it is a separate matter just like we have the Pool One 3 debtors which are also SunCal, but really run very differently. 4 But it is --5 THE COURT: Is this not the subject of the voluntary 6 debtor joint plan or is it separate? 7 MR. PEREZ: It is separate. It's not the subject --THE COURT: All right, understood. 8 The motion is 9 granted as unopposed. Do you have a disk? 10 MR. TILLINGHAST: We can submit it -- I don't have one 11 with me, I'm sorry. 12 THE COURT: Well, as you probably know, a piece of 13 paper like this is not worth the paper it's written on. 14 MR. TILLINGHAST: I'll submit it to you, Your Honor. 15 MR. MILLER: That concludes the calendar, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Fine. We are adjourned until 2 o'clock. 17 IN UNISON: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 11:22 AM) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	1 g 00 01 09		1
		Page 68	
1			
2	INDEX		
3			
4	RULINGS		
5		Page	Line
6	Motion for approval of stipulation, order	26	3
7	regarding Chapter 11 plans and stay		
8	of related discovery, approved		
9	Motion of Joseph Arena, Roland Hansalik,	43	10
10	George Barclay Perry for an order modifying		
11	the automatic stay to allow payment of a		
12	judgment under the directors and officers		
13	insurance policies issued to the debtors,		
14	approved		
15	Merrill Lynch's Motion to compel specific	52	3
16	performance of subordination agreement		
17	terms, denied		
18	Debtors' Motion to amend the order	57	18
19	establishing procedures, approved		
20	Debtors' motion regarding SunCal, granted	65	2
21	ECCU motion for relief from stay, granted	67	9
22			
23			
24			
25			

Page 69 1 2 CERTIFICATION 3 I, Ellen S. Kolman, certify that the foregoing transcript is a 4 5 true and accurate record of the proceedings. 6 Ellen Digitally signed by Ellen Kolman DN: cn=Ellen Kolman, o, ou, 7 email=digital1@veritext.com, Kolman c=US Date: 2011.07.21 15:09:37 -04'00' 8 9 ELLEN S. KOLMAN (CET**D-568) 10 AAERT Certified Electronic Court Transcriber 11 12 Also transcribed by: Zipporah Geralnik (CET**D-489) 13 Karen Schiffmiller (CET**D-570) 14 Sara Davis (CET**D-567) 15 16 Veritext 17 200 Old Country Road 18 Suite 580 19 Mineola, NY 11501 20 21 Date: July 21, 2011 22 23 24 25